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KNOX V. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
INTERNATIONAL UNION: 
BALANCING THE FIRST 





Imagine that your employer, without notice, garnished your wages 
to pay for a political campaign that you did not support. What if, when 
you voiced your objection, your employer told you there was nothing 
you could do about it because the political cause was desperate for 
funding? 
Many Americans would immediately recognize this scenario as an 
infringement of their First Amendment rights. The First Amendment’s 
protection encompasses not only freedom of speech, but also other 
forms of expression, including freedom of implied speech and the 
freedom to make political contributions.1 It ensures that speech-
related regulations are seldom allowed, and when they are, that they 
must be minimally restrictive.2 The First Amendment thus balances 
individual and state interests—and weighs that balance heavily in 
favor of individual rights. 
Knox v. Service Employees International Union3 presents the 
question of what procedure is constitutionally required to protect 
First Amendment interests when a union decides to implement a 
 
*J.D. Candidate, 2013, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977). 
 2.  Brown v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 177, 181 (1956), aff’d, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) 
(stating that restrictions on speech “must find justification in some overriding public interest, 
and that restricting legislation must be narrowly drawn to meet an evil which the state has a 
substantial interest in correcting”). 
 3.  Knox v. SEIU, No. 10-1121 (U.S. argued Jan. 10, 2012). 
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midyear temporary assessment—especially when it intends to use the 
proceeds for political purposes.4 In Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 
1 v. Hudson,5 the Supreme Court laid out the procedures that public-
sector labor unions are constitutionally required to follow when 
collecting annual service fees from employees who are not members 
of the union—“nonmembers.”6 Before collecting these fees, unions 
must now issue a Hudson notice containing certain information about 
the amount and purpose of the fees.7 
In Knox, the Supreme Court must decide how to balance First 
Amendment and union interests in light of the procedures already 
required under Hudson. The Court will clarify what procedures 
unions must follow when raising additional funds mid-year, especially 
if those funds are to be used for ideological expenditures. 
Additionally, the outcome of Knox may have the practical effect of 
eliminating the ability of public-sector unions to finance their political 
activities through midyear assessments. This commentary will discuss 
the facts of Knox, the legal doctrines involved, the lower courts’ 
decisions, and the likely outcome in the Supreme Court. The 
discussion will focus on public-sector unions.8 
II. FACTS 
The State of California recognizes the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU) as the exclusive bargaining agent for 
state employees.9 California and the SEIU have entered into several 
Memoranda of Understanding establishing the terms and conditions 
of employment for the Petitioners and other state employees.10 One 
such condition is that all state employees in specified bargaining 
units—which include the Knox Petitioners—must either join the 
SEIU as formal members or have agency fees deducted from their 
pay.11 
 
 4.  Knox v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. 
June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1121). 
 5.  475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
 6.  Id. at 310. 
 7.  Id. at 306. 
 8.  This article does not address labor unions representing only private-sector employees. 
The word “union” will refer to public-sector unions only. 
 9.  Knox v. Westly, 2008 WL 850128, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d sub nom. Knox 
v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. June 27, 2011) 
(No. 10-1121). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
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The SEIU determines how much it will charge nonmembers in 
agency fees by using a calculation called the “prior-year method.”12 
The SEIU first analyzes its audited expenditures from the prior year 
and determines whether they are “chargeable” or “nonchargeable.”13 
Chargeable expenses are those reasonably made to fulfill the union’s 
duties as the exclusive bargaining representative, and nonmembers 
must contribute to those expenses.14 Conversely, nonmembers cannot 
be required to pay nonchargeable expenses, including expenditures 
made in support of ideological or political activities.15 
Once the categories of expenditures are determined, the SEIU 
determines the amount that it will charge nonmembers.16 The SEIU 
may initially charge nonmembers for any expenditures it made the 
previous year, chargeable or not.17 If a nonmember subsequently 
objects to paying nonchargeable expenses, however, the SEIU must 
charge that individual a “reduced fair share fee” made up of only 
chargeable expenses.18 
Every June, the SEIU issues a Hudson notice, which “is meant to 
provide nonmembers with, inter alia, an adequate explanation for the 
basis of the agency fee.”19 Within thirty days, nonmembers can object 
to paying the full dues and can instead elect to pay the reduced fair 
share fee for that year.20 They may also object to the SEIU’s 
calculation of chargeable and nonchargeable expenses.21 These 
challenges are resolved by an “impartial decisionmaker.”22 
In June of 2005, the SEIU issued its annual Hudson notice, 
wherein the agency fee to be deducted from nonmember employees’ 
 
 12.  Id. at *8. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Foster v. Mahdesian, 268 F.3d 689, 692 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining the prior-year 
method of calculation). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See Knox v. Westly, 2008 WL 850128, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d sub nom. 
Knox v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. June 27, 
2011) (No. 10-1121). The SEIU initially set nonmember fees at 99.1% of union dues. This 
number does not correlate with any identifiable measure of fees and appears to be a unilateral 
determination by the Union. 
 17.  See id. (“The 56.35% was based on the Union’s actual expenditures for the year ending 
December 31, 2004, in which the Union calculated chargeable expenditures to be 56.35% of its 
total expenditures.”). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
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paychecks was set at 99.1% of member dues.23 If a member objected 
to paying this rate, he or she paid the fair share fee of 56.35% of 
member dues.24 The notice did not say that an additional temporary 
assessment would be included in that year’s dues and fees.25 The only 
indication that such an assessment could arise was a clause that said: 
“Dues are subject to change without further notice to fee payers.”26 
On July 30, 2005, the SEIU proposed an “Emergency Temporary 
Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back Fund” to be “use[d] for a 
broad range of political expenses,” rather than for regular union 
expenses.27 In August, SEIU delegates implemented the temporary 
dues increase of 0.25% of salary.28 Nonmembers who had objected to 
the original Hudson notice were charged a percentage of the increase 
equal to the percentage of dues they were already paying.29 
On August 31, the SEIU distributed a letter stating that “the $45 
per month cap on . . . regular dues of 1% gross pay would continue in 
effect, but would not apply to [the] additional .0025 temporary 
increase.”30 This letter stated several reasons for the increase, 
including “elect[ing] a governor and a legislature who support public 
employees and the services they provide” and “defeat[ing] 
Proposition 76 and Proposition 75,” propositions that the Union felt 
would allow the governor to “attack [the SEIU’s] pension plan.”31 
Petitioner Dobrowolski called the SEIU’s office to object to the 
temporary increase.32 The SEIU’s Area Manager told Dobrowolski 
that even if he had objected to paying the full agency fee and was 
currently paying the reduced fair share fee, there was nothing he 
could do to avoid paying the temporary assessment.33 The Area 
Manager said that they were “in the fight of [their] lives” and that the 
assessment was necessary to fund the political expenditures that the 
SEIU intended to make.34 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at *6. 
 30.  Id. at *2. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at *3. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
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Knox, Dobrowolski, and six others filed a claim against the SEIU 
in the Eastern District of California.35 They claimed the SEIU’s 2005 
Hudson notice was inadequate to cover the temporary assessment 
because it “did not provide an adequate explanation of the basis of 
the assessment.”36 The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiffs on those grounds and required the SEIU to 
issue a new Hudson notice.37 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that 
the annual Hudson notice was adequate because it provided 
nonmembers with enough information to decide whether to object.38 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Nonmember Payment of Union Dues 
Under California statute, a public agency may enter into an 
“agency shop”39 agreement with a union that has been recognized as 
the exclusive bargaining unit for a particular class of employee.40 An 
agency-shop agreement requires an employee to either join a union 
or to pay the union a service fee.41 
As the officially recognized and exclusive bargaining 
representative of a particular class of employee, a union is required to 
bargain on behalf of all workers in that class, including nonmembers.42 
Thus, if a union were unable to collect funds from nonmembers to 
finance its bargaining activities, members would have to finance the 
entire cost of the union’s activities while nonmembers would receive 
its benefits for free.43 
A union may require nonmembers to pay “chargeable” expenses, 
which include the costs of negotiating and administering a collective-
 
 35.  Id. at *1. 
 36.  Id. at *4. 
 37.  Id. at *11. 
 38.  Knox v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. 
June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1121). 
 39.  Otherwise known as a “union shop” agreement. 
 40.  Cal. Gov. Code § 3502.5(a) (West 2011). The requirements for a union to become 
officially recognized as the exclusive bargaining unit for a class of public employee are 
unimportant for the purposes of this commentary. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 294 (1986) 
(referring to the Chicago Teachers Union as the “exclusive collective-bargaining 
representative” of the 27,500 employees in the bargaining unit, only 95% of which were 
members of the union). 
 43.  Id. 
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bargaining agreement, the costs of settling grievances and disputes, 
and other expenses reasonably made to fulfill the union’s duties as the 
exclusive bargaining representative.44 Nonmembers are not required, 
however, to pay “nonchargeable” expenses, including expenditures 
made in support of ideological or political activities.45 
The union may determine the amount that will be deducted from 
nonmembers’ paychecks as a fair share fee, provided that this fee does 
not exceed union dues.46 This fee may be comprised of both 
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses.47 Nonmembers must, 
however, be given a chance to object to paying the full fee; any 
objecting nonmember may be charged only a reduced fair share fee 
comprised exclusively of chargeable expenses.48 
B. First Amendment Considerations 
The First Amendment protects implied speech49 and the right to 
make political contributions.50 Agency-shop agreements, absent 
safeguards, create the potential for unions to trample nonmembers’ 
First Amendment rights by using nonmembers’ fees for political 
purposes unrelated to collective bargaining.51 As the Court explained 
in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,52 an employee might have a 
number of ideological objections to union activity: “One individual 
might disagree with a union policy of negotiating limits on the right to 
strike . . . while another might have economic or political objections to 
unionism itself.”53 Allowing the union to forcibly collect dues from 
these nonmembers would violate the nonmembers’ long-recognized 
 
 44.  Foster v. Mahdesian, 268 F.3d 689, 692 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Knox v. Westly, 2008 WL 850128, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d sub nom. Knox 
v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. June 27, 2011) 
(No. 10-1121). 
 47.  See id. at *2 (describing a “reduced fair share fee” consisting of only chargeable 
expenses). 
 48.  See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (explaining that activities 
not germane to the SEIU’s duties as a collective-bargaining agent must be financed by members 
and nonmembers who do not object to those expenditures). 
 49.  Unlike spoken words or writing, implied speech is expression that is not explicit, but 
can be inferred from the speaker’s actions. Id. at 233. For example, an individual may express 
his or her opposition to a message by refusing to participate in demonstrations or refusing to 
contribute to certain funds or causes. See id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 222. 
 52.  431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 53.  Id. 
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First Amendment right to make—or refuse to make—contributions 
for political purposes.54 
In Abood, the Supreme Court held that compelling a nonmember 
to finance political activities unrelated to collective bargaining 
violates the First Amendment.55 A union may, however, collect fees 
from nonmembers to finance union activities related to collective 
bargaining.56 
Because Knox implicates First Amendment rights, the Court will 
need to determine what level of scrutiny to apply. Although public-
sector unions are non-governmental organizations, they are the 
exclusive bargaining agents for state employees; their actions 
therefore qualify as “government action” subject to First Amendment 
review.57 When reviewing governmental action that abridges First 
Amendment rights, the level of scrutiny a court must apply depends 
on whether the government action is content-based or content-
neutral.58 If the government action distinguishes speech based on its 
content, it is a content-based restriction and must be reviewed under 
strict scrutiny.59 To survive strict scrutiny, the government action must 
serve a compelling government interest, and it must be the least 
restrictive means of serving that interest.60 Laws that compel speech 
are subject to the same strict scrutiny standard.61 
C. Hudson Notice 
There are two competing interests at stake when a Hudson notice 
is required—nonmembers’ First Amendment right to refuse to fund 
ideological activities must be balanced against the union’s ability to 
collect a fair share fee to fund collective bargaining. Nonmembers 
cannot be allowed to free ride on a union’s bargaining efforts, but a 
union cannot force nonmembers to contribute funds to union 
activities that do not benefit them, including political activities 
 
 54.  Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302 n.9 (1986). 
 55.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 254. 
 56.  See id. (“[C]ompelling an employee to finance any union activity that may be ‘related’ 
in some way to collective bargaining is permissible under the First Amendment.”). 
 57.  Id. at 226. 
 58.  Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
 59.  Id. at 642–43. 
 60.  Id. at 653. 
 61.  Id. at 642. The standard of review applied to content-neutral regulations is not 
discussed here because the SEIU action in question is content-based—the SEIU required 
nonmembers to contribute to a political fund used to advocate a specific message. 
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unrelated to collective bargaining.62 In Hudson, the Supreme Court 
devised a procedural solution to balance these interests: before 
collecting annual fees, a union must issue a notice, the requirements of 
which protect nonmembers who object to paying the nonchargeable 
portion of the union-determined fair share fee.63 Under Hudson, the 
notice must include “an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, 
a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee 
before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts 
reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending.”64 
The purpose of explaining the basis for the agency fee is to 
provide nonmembers with enough information to “identify the impact 
on [their] rights and to assert a meritorious First Amendment claim.”65 
The Hudson opinion also mentions that “adequate disclosure surely 
would include the major categories of expenses, as well as verification 
by an independent auditor.”66 
The union must also provide nonmembers with “a reasonably 
prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an 
impartial decisionmaker.”67 Hudson does not provide any guidance as 
to how much time may elapse between a nonmember’s objection and 
the hearing date, but a period of five months was considered 
reasonably prompt in one Minnesota case.68 By contrast, in Tavernor v. 
Illinois Federation of Teachers,69 the Seventh Circuit held that a period 
of one year was “far from prompt.”70 The Hudson Court did, however, 
provide a small explanation of the “impartial decisionmaker” 
requirement: a union may not exercise an unrestricted choice among 
arbitrators on the state list.71 
Finally, during these procedures, the union must place any funds 
reasonably in dispute into an escrow account.72 This requirement 
ensures that the union is unable to use wrongfully collected funds as a 
 
 62.  Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 524 (1991). 
 63.  Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302 (1986). 
 64.  Id. at 310. 
 65.  Id. at 294. 
 66.  Id. at 307 n.18. The agency need not go as far as providing an exhaustive itemized list 
of all expenditures. 
 67.  Id. at 310. 
 68.  Kuehn v. American Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 435 N.W.2d 130, 135 (Minn. 
App. 1989). 
 69.  226 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 70.  Id. at 848. 
 71.  Hudson, 475 U.S. at 308. 
 72.  Id. at 310. 
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type of forced loan while resolution of the objection is pending.73 Such 
procedures are necessary to maintain the balance between 
nonmembers’ First Amendment rights and a union’s interest in 
avoiding free riders.74 
IV. HOLDING 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling in Knox v. 
Westly75 and remanded with orders to deny Petitioners’ motion for 
summary judgment.76 Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de 
novo, the Ninth Circuit employed a balancing test to determine the 
adequacy of the SEIU’s Hudson notice: they sought to “prevent 
compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees who 
object thereto without restricting the SEIU’s ability to require every 
employee to contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining 
activities.”77 The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected strict scrutiny review 
because it felt that it was bound by the standard set forth in Hudson.78 
Applying that balancing test, the Ninth Circuit decided that SEIU 
met the Hudson requirements because its annual notice warned that 
“[d]ues [were] subject to change without further notice.”79 
In so deciding, the Ninth Circuit assigned great weight to the fact 
that unions are required to base the calculation of their fair share fees 
on audited figures.80 Because expenditures from the prior year were 
the most recent audited figures available, it would have been 
impossible for the SEIU to use any other method or to precisely 
calculate the chargeable expenses for the upcoming year.81 The 
calculation in the June 2005 Hudson notice was therefore a 
reasonable accommodation of nonmembers’ First Amendment rights 
under the balancing test.82 
 
 
 73.  Id. at 309. 
 74.  Id. at 294. 
 75.  2008 WL 850128, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d sub nom. Knox v. SEIU, 628 
F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1121). 
 76.  Knox v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. 
June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1121). 
 77.  Id. at 1119–20 (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 302). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 1120. 
 80.  Id. at 1121. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 1121. 
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Additionally, the court stated that the political nature of the 
temporary assessment was irrelevant because the Petitioners brought 
a procedural Hudson challenge rather than a challenge to the 
chargeability of the assessment.83 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that 
the following year’s audited figures would reflect the assessment’s 
chargeability.84 The following year’s fair share fee, then, would be 
discounted by the amount of nonchargeable expenses that were 
included in the assessment.85 The Ninth Circuit also noted that 
nonmembers who objected to the initial Hudson notice and were 
paying a reduced fair share fee were not charged 100% of the 
assessment, but a reduced percentage of 56.35%.86 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected as “unworkable” the District 
Court’s holding that a union must issue a second Hudson notice 
whenever it intends to drastically depart from its typical spending 
regime.87 The prior-year method, the court said, assumes that a union 
has no typical spending regime because expenditures vary from year 
to year and are accounted for in the following year’s fees.88 The Ninth 
Circuit therefore rejected the District Court’s framework because it 
would require a procedural scheme that places the least burden on 
fee-payers rather than merely reasonably accommodating their First 
Amendment rights.89 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: first, whether 
a state, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, may 
condition employment on the payment of a special union assessment 
intended for political expenditures without the union first providing a 
Hudson notice and an opportunity for nonmembers to object; and 
second, whether political expenditures for ballot measures are 
chargeable to nonmembers.90 On October 3, 2011, the SEIU filed a 
motion to dismiss the case as moot.91 The Supreme Court deferred its 
decision on mootness until it heard oral argument on the merits.92 
 
 83.  Id. at 1122 n.4. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 1122. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 1123. 
 90.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Knox v. SEIU, No. 10-1121 (U.S. Mar. 10, 2011). 
 91.  Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as Moot, Knox v. SEIU, No. 10-1121 (U.S. Oct. 3, 
2011). 
 92.  Knox v. SEIU Proceedings and Orders, SUPREMECOURT.GOV (Last visited Mar. 23, 
2012) http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-1121.htm. 
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V. ARGUMENTS 
The parties present arguments regarding two issues: the Hudson 
requirements for temporary assessments and the chargeability of the 
SEIU’s midyear assessment.93 Petitioners argue that a union must 
issue a new Hudson notice in the event of a temporary assessment,94 
while Respondent argues that a separate notice is not required if the 
original notice warned nonmembers that fees were subject to 
increase.95 Petitioners contend that even if the SEIU’s procedures 
were adequate, the temporary assessment was nonchargeable because 
the expenses were unrelated to collective bargaining.96 Respondents 
argue that while the assessment was used for political expenses, those 
expenses were nonetheless related to collective bargaining because 
the particular ideological causes on which they were spent implicated 
the stability of collective-bargaining agreements.97 
A. Hudson Requirements for Midyear Temporary Assessments 
1. Petitioners’ Arguments 
Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is inconsistent 
with both Hudson and the strict scrutiny standard of review applied 
to compelled speech in other contexts.98 Petitioners begin by arguing 
that strict scrutiny applies in this case and that the SEIU’s actions did 
not satisfy this exacting standard. First, in Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale,99 the Court established the principle that First Amendment 
rights may only be abridged by regulations that are narrowly tailored 
to serve compelling state interests and that are unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas.100 Second, Petitioners assert that strict scrutiny 
applies to the procedures surrounding the collection of union dues 
because unionism is a type of “compelled expressive association” 
subject to First Amendment strict scrutiny review.101 Therefore, 
“government-compelled association with a union agent is subject to 
the most exacting levels of constitutional scrutiny,” and the Ninth 
 
 93.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 90, at i. 
 94.  Brief for Petitioners at 19, Knox v. SEIU, No. 10-1121 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2011). 
 95.  Brief for Respondent at 31, Knox v. SEIU, No. 10-1121 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2011). 
 96.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 94, at 24. 
 97.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 49–50. 
 98.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 94, at 10. 
 99.  530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 100.  Id. at 648. 
 101.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 94, at 15. 
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Circuit was wrong to have applied a balancing test.102 The “self-
evident” reason for applying strict scrutiny in cases of compelled 
political speech—that such compelled speech corrupts the democratic 
process—requires that strict scrutiny be applied in this case because 
the assessment was used for political expenses.103 
Petitioners then argue that temporary assessments are not exempt 
from Hudson requirements, and the SEIU’s actions thus do not pass 
strict scrutiny.104 When a union imposes any new financial obligation 
on employees, it must comply with Hudson requirements because to 
do otherwise would strip the employees of their First Amendment 
right to avoid the risk that their money will be used, even temporarily, 
for activities unrelated to collective bargaining.105 
This risk is especially acute with regard to nonmembers who did 
not object to paying the normal agency fee, but who would have if 
they had known the SEIU was going to issue a temporary assessment 
for political purposes.106 They argue that the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
required nonmembers opposed to the temporary assessment to have 
objected to the original Hudson notice—a month in advance of when 
the assessment was even proposed—based only on the SEIU’s 
statement that “[d]ues are subject to change without further notice to 
fee payers.”107 That statement did not provide sufficient information 
for nonmembers to gauge whether to object to the temporary 
increase and was thus inconsistent with Hudson and strict scrutiny 
review. 
2. Respondent’s Arguments 
Respondent claims that the Petitioners’ argument for strict 
scrutiny ignores concerns of practicality and administrability.108 
According to Respondent, Petitioners’ concerns are not about 
substantive First Amendment rights, but rather procedural rights, 
which merit only a balancing analysis.109 Hudson’s balancing test 
attempts to avoid “compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by 
 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 17. 
 104.  Id. at 19. 
 105.  Id. at 20 (citing Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 
(1986)). 
 106.  Id. at 21. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 31. 
 109.  Id. 
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employees who object thereto without restricting the SEIU’s ability 
to require every employee to contribute to the cost of collective 
bargaining.”110 The Petitioners’ invocation of the right of expressive 
association is misplaced, Respondent argues, because Petitioners rely 
solely on cases in which compelled association interfered with a 
group’s right to express its message.111 By contrast, Petitioners are 
individuals who do not comprise an expressive association, and their 
affiliation with the SEIU does not interfere with the expression of any 
particular message.112 Petitioners’ compelled-speech argument is 
similarly misplaced because “[a] compelled speech violation occurs 
only where ‘the complaining speaker’s own message [is] affected by 
the speech it [is] forced to accommodate.’”113 Finally, Respondent 
argues that strict scrutiny does not apply in this case because “a 
statute permitting fair share fee payments to [a] bargaining 
representative . . . has never triggered strict scrutiny.”114 
Respondent then asserts that the SEIU complied with the 
requirements in Hudson and that any further procedural 
requirements would cripple the SEIU’s ability to collect fair share 
fees.115 Hudson’s prior-year calculation requires only that the SEIU 
calculate its fees using expenditures verified by an independent 
auditor and an accurate prediction of the upcoming year’s 
expenditures is not expected.116 Respondent asserts that the Hudson 
procedures were followed “to the letter” because the original notice 
contained a warning that dues were subject to increase.117 
Furthermore, because objectors to the original notice were charged a 
reduced percentage, the temporary increase did not require objectors 
to subsidize the SEIU’s nonchargeable expenses.118 
Finally, Respondent argues that it is irrelevant that some non-
objectors might have objected had they known about the temporary 
increase.119 Potential objectors had access to the original Hudson 
notice, which clearly stated that a significant portion of dues was to be 
 
 110.  Id. at 32 (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 302). 
 111.  Id. at 36. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63 
(2006)). 
 114.  Id. at 38. 
 115.  Id. at 11. 
 116.  Id. at 12. 
 117.  Id. at 13. 
 118.  Id. at 16. 
 119.  Id. 
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spent on nonchargeable political expenditures.120 And because 
Hudson does not require advance notice of specific expenditures, 
notice of significant nonchargeable political expenditures, along with 
notice of the potential for a midyear increase, was sufficient for 
employees to decide whether to object.121 In other words, employees 
who did not object to the original notice have missed their chance 
because Hudson procedures are meant to shield only “nonmembers 
who are opposed to ‘ideological expenditures of any sort that are 
unrelated to collective bargaining.’”122 
B. Chargeability of Political Expenditures for Ballot Measures 
1. Petitioners’ Arguments 
Petitioners also argue that compelling employees to pay a 
temporary assessment to fund nonchargeable expenses violated their 
First Amendment rights.123 Petitioners assert that chargeable union 
expenditures must not only be germane to collective bargaining, but 
must also satisfy strict scrutiny.124 The germaneness standard, 
according to Petitioners, merely serves a gatekeeping function in a 
court’s analysis of whether a particular union expenditure is 
chargeable—it does not substitute for a strict scrutiny analysis of that 
expenditure.125 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the 
expenditures were chargeable on the sole basis that they were 
germane to the SEIU’s collective-bargaining duties.126 
Petitioners challenge the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion that the 
expenditures made to defeat Proposition 76 were chargeable.127 They 
argue that these expenditures were not germane to the SEIU’s 
collective bargaining duties because the only reference to collective 
bargaining in Proposition 76 “addressed the way that the general 
 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 18 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 235, 241 (1977)). Here, 
Respondent seems to be interpreting the phrase “any sort” to mean that Hudson procedures are 
meant to protect nonmembers who are opposed to the SEIU spending money on ideological 
activities at all, and that the protection does not extend to content-based objections. However, 
this language is ambiguous and could be interpreted to mean that nonmembers may object to 
any individual ideological expenditures that are unrelated to collective bargaining. 
 123.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 94, at 24. 
 124.  Id. at 25–26 (citing Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991)). 
 125.  Id. at 27. 
 126.  Id. at 26. 
 127.  Id. at 35. 
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revenue stream for the entire State government might be altered” and 
“placed no particular collective bargaining agreement . . . in specific 
jeopardy of abrogation” by the Governor.128 And, even if Proposition 
76 had a relationship to the SEIU’s collective-bargaining duties, these 
expenses would still be nonchargeable; compelling employees to pay 
these expenses would constitute an egregious infringement of their 
First Amendment rights because the expenses were related to 
political speech.129 
2. Respondent’s Arguments 
Respondent counters that Petitioners do not properly present 
their claims as to the chargeability of the expenditures. First, 
Respondent argues that Petitioners’ claim is strictly a procedural 
challenge and not a substantive challenge to the spending of the fees 
in question.130 Respondent bases this argument on the fact that “the 
text of Proposition 76 and its legislative history are not contained 
anywhere in the record of [the] case.”131 The Ninth Circuit did not 
hold that the expenses were chargeable, Respondent argues, but 
rather mentioned in passing that they might be chargeable and that 
the question was not properly litigated.132 
Second, Respondent argues that even if the Court were to reach 
the chargeability claim, it should reject it on the merits.133 The 
expenses used to defeat Proposition 76 were germane to the SEIU’s 
collective-bargaining duties because Proposition 76 “would have 
effectively permitted the Governor to abrogate the SEIU’s collective-
bargaining agreements under certain circumstances.”134 The SEIU 
further argues that the expenditures pass strict scrutiny because the 
defeat of Proposition 76 was necessary to avoid the government 
cutting employees’ bargained-for wages and benefits. Also, the 
opposition to Proposition 76 did not significantly burden any First 
Amendment rights because disagreements with the SEIU’s strategy 
are inherent in agency-shop arrangements; Petitioners may not refuse 
to pay simply because they disagree with the SEIU’s strategy.135 
 
 128.  Id. at 37. 
 129.  Id. at 38. 
 130.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 43. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 45. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 49–50. 
 135.  Id. at 53. 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court is faced with a loophole left by Hudson’s 
incomplete coverage of union financing methods. Barring a finding of 
mootness, the Court is likely to use this case to close that gap by 
reversing the Ninth Circuit. To do otherwise would allow unions, 
which are meant to protect employees from the superior bargaining 
power of employers, to take advantage of those very same employees 
to finance union leaders’ political agendas. Reversing the Ninth 
Circuit would be consistent with the text and purpose of Hudson as 
well as the strict scrutiny standard of review used in other areas of 
First Amendment jurisprudence. 
The Supreme Court will first have to address the Ninth Circuit’s 
reliance on the balancing test. The Ninth Circuit did not employ strict 
scrutiny review because it interpreted Hudson to require a balance 
between nonmembers’ First Amendment rights and unions’ ability to 
collect fair share fees.136 The Court could find two flaws in the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis. First, the Ninth Circuit improperly weighed these 
interests equally; the SEIU’s ability to collect its fair share fees was 
subject to only a reasonable accommodation of nonmembers’ First 
Amendment rights.137 These interests, though, are not equal in 
importance. Nonmembers’ First Amendment rights must outweigh 
the SEIU’s interests because a union does not have a constitutional 
right to collect fees from nonmembers for expenses other than those 
associated with collective bargaining.138 
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Hudson ignores that 
case’s facts and text, which indicate that the Hudson requirements are 
an acceptable way to satisfy strict scrutiny rather than a substitute for 
that standard. Strict scrutiny review is, after all, a balancing of 
government and First Amendment interests; the framework merely 
makes sure that courts weigh individual First Amendment interests 
more heavily than the government’s interest.  
The union action at issue in Hudson, like the action at issue here, 
would have triggered a strict scrutiny analysis based on the fact that it 
 
 136.  Knox v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 
(U.S. June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1121). 
 137.  See id. at 1120 (employing a “reasonable accommodation” test as articulated in 
Grunwald v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 138.  See Chicago Teacher’s Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302–03 (1986) 
(explaining that nonunion employees have an interest in having their fees used principally for 
collective-bargaining purposes). 
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involved compelled political contributions.139 The Hudson Court did 
not fashion an entirely new standard of review for First Amendment 
actions simply because it was dealing with union dues.140 The Ninth 
Circuit ignored language requiring fee collection procedures to be 
“carefully tailored to minimize” infringement of nonmembers’ First 
Amendment rights.141 Admittedly, Hudson did not explicitly employ 
the usual strict scrutiny formulation. However, footnote eleven in 
Hudson demonstrates that the Court did, in fact, apply a strict 
scrutiny analysis.142 The Court cited Roberts v. United States Jaycees143 
for the proposition that “infringements on freedom of association 
‘may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state 
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be 
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational 
freedoms.’”144 Footnote eleven also references Elrod v. Burns,145 which 
held that government means must be “least restrictive of freedom of 
belief and association.”146 The Hudson Court’s reliance on these cases 
indicates that Hudson, rather than creating a new balancing test, 
merely articulates procedural requirements that satisfy a strict 
scrutiny standard of review. 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling is also inconsistent with the purpose of 
Hudson: to allow non-union employees “a fair opportunity to identify 
the impact of the governmental action on [their] interests and to 
assert a meritorious First Amendment claim.”147 Here, the SEIU’s 
Hudson notice mentioned only that fees were subject to increase; it 
 
 139.  See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (stating that regulations 
compelling an individual or entity to speak in order to avoid the appearance of agreement with 
the expressed message trigger strict scrutiny). Here, objecting nonmembers could very well feel 
compelled to express their individual views on Proposition 76 in order to avoid appearing like 
they agree with the SEIU’s view. Respondent argues that compelled speech violations only 
occur when the objector’s own message is affected, but this is unpersuasive—by forcing 
nonmembers to contribute funds to ideological causes they disagree with, the expression of their 
personal beliefs is inherently affected as those funds are no longer available for them to spend 
on their own personal expression. 
 140.  See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 303 (“[T]he fact that those rights are protected by the First 
Amendment requires that the procedure be carefully tailored to minimize the infringement.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 303 n.11. 
 143.  468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 144.  Hudson, 475 U.S. at 303 n.11 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (1984)) (emphasis 
added). 
 145.  427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
 146.  Hudson, 475 U.S. at 303 n.11 (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363 (1976)). 
 147.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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did not say for what purposes or by how much.148 The SEIU then 
hastily put together its “Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a 
Political Fight-Back Fund,” which it has conceded was not meant for 
regular union expenditures.149 Through this misleading course of 
action, the SEIU was able to collect funds for nonchargeable 
expenses from nonmembers who did not have enough information to 
object to the original Hudson notice. It can hardly be said that such 
incomplete information afforded the nonmembers a fair chance to 
object. 
The Ninth Circuit dismissed as unworkable the District Court’s 
requirement of a second Hudson notice upon “drastic departure” 
from a union’s typical spending regime. But it would not be 
unreasonable to require a union to issue a second Hudson notice 
when the union has new information about its spending regime to 
which nonmembers might reasonably object. By their very nature, 
temporary assessments are issued because the originally collected 
dues are inadequate to cover specific union expenses. When issuing a 
temporary assessment, the union will have information about what it 
wants to spend money on and how much money the temporary 
increase will raise—information withheld from the employees in the 
original Hudson notice. Further, the prior-year method is meant to 
substitute for the precise calculation of the upcoming figures.150 In this 
case, that information is actually available, so Respondent does not 
need to rely on the prior-year method. Hudson does not require a 
union to predict the upcoming year’s finances with 100% accuracy, 
but it does require that the union divulge information it has about 
upcoming expenditures.151 It is not fair for the union to use this 
information disparity to bulldoze nonmembers’ First Amendment 
rights and force them to finance activities to which they object. 
 
 
 148.  Knox v. Westly, 2008 WL 850128, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev’d sub nom. Knox 
v. SEIU, 628 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3061 (U.S. June 27, 2011) 
(No. 10-1121). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307 n.18 (“[T]here are practical reasons why absolute 
precision in the calculation of the charge to nonmembers cannot be expected or required. Thus, 
for instance, the Union cannot be faulted for calculating its fee on the basis of its expenses 
during the preceding year.”). 
 151.  See id. at 306 (“Since the unions possess the facts and records from which the 
proportion of political to total union expenditures may reasonably be calculated, basic 
considerations of fairness compel that they . . . bear the burden of proving such proportion.” 
(quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 239–40 n.40 (1977))). 
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In addition, the fairness principle may indicate that the Hudson 
requirements are actually altogether inapplicable in the case of 
temporary assessments. The SEIU justifies its actions by noting that 
Hudson requires it to base its notices on audited figures.152 But it does 
not follow that once a union issues its annual Hudson notice based on 
those audited figures, it is fair for the union to increase fees mid-year 
for political purposes simply because those figures will not be audited 
until the following year. Because of this inconsistency, the Supreme 
Court may be justified in finding that Hudson does not even address 
temporary assessments. 
If the Court finds Hudson does not properly address temporary 
fee increases, it likely will apply a strict scrutiny analysis. Under this 
standard, the SEIU’s actions are clearly unconstitutional. Under Ellis 
v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, and Steamship Clerks,153 a union 
cannot constitutionally collect from dissenting nonmembers money 
that will be used in support of ideological causes not germane to its 
collective-bargaining duties.154 Although Respondent argues that the 
chargeability of the increase is not properly presented,155 in the event 
that the Court determines that Hudson does not address temporary 
assessments, chargeability will be a crucial element in deciding 
whether the SEIU’s actions survive a traditional strict scrutiny 
analysis. If the Court determines that the expenses are nonchargeable, 
then it was unconstitutional for the SEIU to collect them in the first 
place, regardless of the procedures they used to do so.156 
In addition, there are compelling practical reasons why the 
Supreme Court should rule in favor of the Petitioners. If the Court 
rules for Respondent, unions will only be required to issue Hudson 
notices that include a simple warning to nonmembers that “dues are 
subject to increase.” A union could then obtain forced loans from 
nonmembers by issuing temporary assessments despite the fact that 
the union intends to use the increase on nonchargeable expenses. This 
loophole neutralizes nonmembers’ constitutional right to avoid the 
risk that their money will be used, even temporarily, for political 
purposes to which they are opposed. 
 
 152.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 12. 
 153.  466 U.S. 435 (1984). 
 154.  Id. at 447. 
 155.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 95, at 43. 
 156.  See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 447 (stating that unions cannot constitutionally collect any money 
for the support of ideological causes unrelated to their collective-bargaining duties). 
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Finally, allowing unions to raise political funds through midyear 
assessments could have negative effects on the function of agency-
shop agreements. Members and nonmembers alike will begin to 
mistrust unions that take advantage of this loophole. Nonmembers 
will be forced to object to every single Hudson notice they receive 
because of the risk that the union will issue a temporary assessment. 
These objections will increase administrative costs for unions and 
decrease the funds that are available for any purpose. The effects may 
cut into unions’ ability to perform their collective-bargaining 
functions. In its most extreme form, this mistrust may result in public 
employees choosing to decertify their unions, leaving them at the 
mercy of the superior bargaining power of their employers. 
VII. LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The Supreme Court will most likely rule in favor of the Petitioners 
in order to avoid the practical consequences of allowing unions to 
raise political funds by issuing midyear assessments without notice. In 
particular, the court will likely try to prevent the massive proceedings 
associated with the increased number of objections such a loophole 
would necessitate. In addition, a ruling for the Petitioners is the only 
outcome that would be consistent with Hudson, First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and the Constitution. 
 
